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Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The study provides knowledge as to the effective-
ness of increasing capacity buffers to reduce hos-
pital access times.
 ► A particular strength of this study relates to the 
novel structured approach adopted to investigate 
hospital access times that generates a thorough 
understanding of actions to reduce these and their 
consequences over a prolonged period.
 ► Another strength of this study is its combination of 
both objective performance data retrieved from the 
hospital database and subjective qualitative data to 
explain past occurrences.
 ► Although the dyadic structure of general practi-
tioners and a small rheumatology department with 
new and returning patients is relatively simple and 
open to analysis, it does not represent the more 
complex networks with multiple interdependencies 
seen in many other situations.
 ► Another limitation relates to the adopted single case 
study approach which limits the generalisability of 
the findings, although the phenomena we identify 
are widely relevant and not unique to the setting.
ABSTRACT
Objectives To investigate the consequences of increasing 
capacity to reduce access times, and to explore how 
patient waiting times and use of physical capacity were 
influenced by variability.
Design A retrospective case study that combines both 
primary and secondary data. Secondary data were 
retrieved from a hospital database to establish inflow 
and outflow of patients, utilisation of resources and 
available capacity, realised access times and the weekly 
number of new patients seen over 1 year. Primary data 
consisted of field notes, onsite visits and observations, and 
semistructured interviews.
Setting A secondary care facility, that is, a rheumatology 
department, in a large Dutch hospital.
Participants Analyses are based on secondary patient 
data from the hospital database, and the responses of the 
interviews with physicians, nurses and Lean Six Sigma 
project leaders.
Results The study shows that artificial variability was 
increased by managerial decisions to add capacity and 
to allow an increased inflow of new patients. This, in 
turn, resulted in undesirable and significant fluctuations 
in access times. We argue that we witnessed a new 
multiplier effect that typifies the fluctuations.
Conclusions Adding capacity resources to reduce access 
times might appear an obvious and effective solution. 
However, the outcomes were less straightforward than 
expected, and even led to new artificial variability. The 
study reveals a phenomenon that is specific to service 
environments, and especially healthcare, and has 
detrimental consequences for access times.
InTRODuCTIOn
It seems very logical that, when confronted 
with long access times, one increases capacity 
to more quickly serve clients: an obvious 
solution to a clear problem, or so it appears. 
However, this study shows the possible adverse 
consequences of adding physical capacity to 
reduce access times, which we define as the 
time between referral from the general prac-
titioner (GP) to the first visit of the patient to 
the rheumatology department. In addition, 
we provide a theoretical frame of reference to 
help understand the underlying mechanism 
that causes the adverse effects.
Patient flow is a topic of ongoing interest 
in healthcare research.1–4 However, obtaining 
flow is not easy, and one has to be sensitive to 
barriers such as limited internal integration,5 
paradoxes such as improvements that target 
parts of a system, but fail to address under-
lying system constraints,6 and strategies that 
do not address the linkages between process, 
population and capacity.7 Especially, limited 
capacity can be a considerable bottleneck that 
impedes patient flow. Hence, it makes sense 
to increase capacity to alleviate this process 
constraint.8 In turn, a smooth patient flow 
is obtained, characterised by short patient 
waiting times.
In our study, we are especially interested in 
the access time as a specific type of waiting 
time. Achieving short access times is important 
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for healthcare providers: reducing access times can posi-
tively affect the patients’ condition (eg, by reducing pain) 
and can prevent further problems as medical conditions 
can deteriorate while waiting for treatment.9 10 Despite 
this, consistently achieving short access times is difficult. 
One of the main barriers to achieving short access times, 
and short waiting times in general, is variability.11
One can distinguish between natural and artifi-
cial variabilities.12–14 Natural variability is inevitable in 
healthcare and can only be controlled to a very limited 
extent: natural variability is a ‘fact of life’, for example 
the different responses to similar treatment between 
patients. In contrast, artificial variability is caused by our 
own actions, routines or regulations. For example, vari-
ability stemming from providing inconsistent quality of 
referral information by GPs.15 This type of variability can 
and should be controlled and reduced. (For a more elab-
orate discussion of artificial variability and related exam-
ples, see Dempsey16)
The mechanisms that allow an organisation, or more 
precisely a process, to cope with variability are termed 
buffers. Some form of buffer will be required to cope 
with variability in either supply or demand.17 The avail-
able buffers in a healthcare environment consist of time 
buffers (waiting patients) and capacity buffers (idle 
resource capacity).18 Healthcare is thus faced with a 
trade-off between either waiting patients or idle capacity, 
both of which are unattractive. Buffers are the natural 
result of a system that has to cope with variability, but 
one should continuously attempt to minimise buffers and 
reduce their underlying causes.19
Increasing capacity buffers seem to be the most effec-
tive solution if one wants to reduce the time buffers repre-
sented by hospital access times. However, during a recent 
improvement project, we witnessed adverse outcomes 
from expanding capacity to cope with long access times. 
This led us to the following research question: why does 
expanding capacity lead to variation in patient waiting 
times? This study aims to contribute to knowledge on 
the dynamic relationship between variability and patient 
waiting times, and to the understanding of fluctuations in 
hospital access times.
In the remainder of this paper, we first introduce the 
methodology applied by explaining the hospital setting 
and the approaches used in obtaining and analysing the 
empirical data. Following this, we present the results of 
our analysis, and then a discussion reflecting on the inter-
action between variability and buffers. This interaction 
turned out to be less straightforward than expected. This 
paper then ends with the conclusions in which we high-
light our main contributions.
MeThODS
The research setting for this study was the rheumatology 
department of a Dutch teaching hospital. The hospital had 
embarked on an improvement programme with several 
projects focussing on improving flow performance. These 
projects allowed us to study the impact of actions aimed at 
reducing access times defined as the time from the referral 
of the GP to the first visit of the rheumatology department. 
The rheumatology department employed two specialists 
(physicians), a specialised nurse practitioner and a rheuma-
tology patient advisor that together served 9277 patients in 
2013. As the access time was rather long (up to 16 weeks) 
and the utilisation rate of the two physicians was high, the 
hospital board decided to initiate an improvement project.
The aim of this research was to understand the complex 
interaction between variability and buffers. To study a 
complex phenomenon in its natural setting, we applied the 
single retrospective case study methodology.20 While our 
study was quantitative in nature, we have added a qualita-
tive component to explain past events, and strengthen our 
understanding of the identified phenomenon. The data 
gathered were used to study the interaction between vari-
ability and buffering and the fluctuations in access times 
through an operations management lens, a perspective 
especially appropriate for issues related to patient flow.
Case description
The typical patient pathway in our case setting is as 
follows. A patient experiences problems with their joints, 
and visits their GP. The GP will refer the patient to a rheu-
matologist, who will examine the patient at an outpa-
tient clinic. If deemed necessary, the rheumatologist will 
request additional diagnostic tests (an ultrasound exam-
ination, X-ray, blood test, etc). The rheumatologist will 
then discuss a treatment plan with the patient and notify 
their GP. Alongside the rheumatologists, the nurse prac-
titioner serves a small, predefined, group of new patients 
whose symptoms lack complexity.
The rheumatology department distinguishes three types 
of consultation requests determined by the perceived 
urgency of the problem: (1) regular, (2) semiurgent and 
(3) urgent patients. Of the new patient arrivals, 7% are 
considered urgent and 6% semiurgent. Standard access 
times have been predetermined for urgent and semi-
urgent patients (2 weeks and 4 weeks respectively). No 
target access time has been set for ‘regular’ patients who 
form the majority of new arrivals. Before the improve-
ment project was initiated, the average access time across 
patients was around 10 weeks with peaks up to 16 weeks.
Data sources
This study combines several secondary data sources from 
the hospital database: inflow and outflow (new arrivals and 
patients leaving the system), utilisation of resources and 
available capacity, realised access times and the number 
of new patients per week over 1 year (2013). In addition to 
these secondary data sources, we acquired primary quali-
tative data through keeping field notes, onsite visits and 
observations, and semistructured interviews with physi-
cians, nurses and Lean Six Sigma (LSS) project leaders.
During the interviews, questions were focused on 
obtaining in-depth information on possible sources of 
variability. We used an interview protocol to enhance 
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Figure 1 Weekly capacities in person-days and median access times.
both the reliability and the validity of the research.20 
Combining objective quantitative and subjective quali-
tative data contributes to the accuracy and reliability of 
case study research.20 In addition, the physicians, nurses 
and LSS project leaders had a crucial role during a focus 
group meeting in which we reflected on the outcomes of 
the analyses and attempted to build an understanding 
what had occurred.
Analysis approach
This study required an in-depth exploration of access time 
data, for which there is no standard approach. Therefore, 
the initial analysis involved calculating the median and 
mean access times for each week. The median is often 
used in analyses of highly variable data because it is 
less sensitive to outliers than the mean. In addition, we 
performed an independent sample t-test on the means 
of the access times to compare the pre-intervention and 
post-intervention periods.
Next to median access times, we calculated the 90th 
percentile of the access times for each week to detect 
whether any apparent changes in access times affected a 
large majority (ie, at least 90%) of patients. We constructed 
diagrams that relate capacity and access times over time, 
through which we provide insights into the dynamics of 
time and capacity buffers.
To deepen the analysis of flow-related variables, we 
followed a previously used approach21 making use of 
throughput diagrams that show both cumulative patient 
inflow and outflow curves over time. The vertical distance 
between the two curves reflects the number of waiting 
patients while the horizontal distance reflects the backlog 
in terms of time. The behaviour of these two variables can 
be analysed over time and at the same time be related to 
fluctuating patient inflow and outflow rates. As such it is 
particularly useful in dynamic situations where the aver-
ages change over time. Finally, the relative share of new 
and returning patients was analysed to detect any ratio 
changes over time.
In the analyses, the weekly capacity in person-days is 
calculated based on the number of scheduled physicians 
and corrected for any absences. The capacity information 
is based on the available calendars of the physicians. This 
capacity is allocated to new and returning patients.
Patient and public involvement statement
This research did not involve patients in the design, 
conduct and reporting of the research. The results of this 
work were presented and discussed during a focus group 
meeting with representatives of the hospital. Once the 
study has been published, the main findings will be used 
in the education of Master students.
ReSulTS
Figure 1 depicts the capacity in person-days each week and 
the access times (in weeks) for patients being referred by 
their GP in that week. The analysis shows that, up to week 
31, the maximum capacity was 10 person-days, that is, two 
full-time physicians.
In an attempt to reduce the access times, an intern 
(shown in red) provided additional capacity from week 31. 
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Figure 2 90th percentile of access times.
In addition, in weeks 33 through 39, a resident provided 
a further temporary boost to capacity. Here, we note that 
the productivity of the resident was expected to be similar 
to that of the rheumatologists, whereas the intern would 
achieve roughly one-third of their output due to a lack of 
experience. The graph is adjusted to reflect this differ-
ence. In effect, by increasing staff, the department sought 
to replace time buffers (waiting patients) with capacity 
buffers (additional physicians).
The expansion in capacity resulted in an almost imme-
diate drop in access times from week 31 onwards. The 
reduction of access times, measured in days, for indi-
vidual patients is significant at a level of p<0.001 when 
comparing patients that arrived in weeks 1–29 (M=72, 
SD=42) with patients that arrived in weeks 32–52 (M=29, 
SD=38). Weeks 30 and 31 have been excluded as the tran-
sition period. In terms of variability, figure 1 shows that 
the actual capacity in just over half of the weeks of the 
first 6 months was below the notional 10 person-days, and 
often significantly so. That is, there were more weeks in 
which at least one rheumatologist was partly absent than 
weeks in which both were fully present. This illustrates 
that, in this case, capacity availability is a relevant source 
of artificial variability.
Furthermore, figure 1 shows that, in week 28, more 
than half of the appointments made had an access time 
of at least 16 weeks in the future (the median value). 
Whereas, in week 32, half of the appointments made were 
for within 1 week. In other words, patients that sought an 
appointment in week 28 often had to wait a further 16 
weeks for their meeting with a physician, whereas patients 
that joined the list in week 32 would usually see their 
physician within a few days.
When we look at the 90th percentile of recorded access 
times (figure 2), there is no equivalent and sustained 
immediate improvement after week 31, indicating that a 
substantial number of patients still experienced lengthy 
access times. However, from week 46 on, there was a 
significant drop in the 90th percentile, indicating that the 
access times for the majority of patients had decreased in 
the final weeks of the year.
Influences on access times can also be analysed using 
throughput diagrams (figure 3). The vertical axis shows 
cumulative numbers of patients. The upper (green) curve 
represents the cumulative inflow and the lower (blue) 
curve the cumulative outflow. To ensure data validity, the 
inflow curve is not shown after week 47 because some of 
the patients then applying for appointments might not 
have access until the first weeks of the following year, 
which would distort any conclusions.
The horizontal distance between the two curves in 
figure 3 is the backlog (in weeks) and can be interpreted 
as the projected access time for a patient requesting an 
appointment at that point in time. A red curve, repre-
senting this horizontal distance, is included, with values 
indicated on the secondary vertical axis. For example, 
the 400th request for an appointment (inflow) was made 
in week 17, and the 400th appointment (outflow) was 
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Figure 4 Weekly inflow of new patients.
Figure 3 Throughput diagram including derived mean access times.
scheduled for week 29 (but not necessarily the same 
patient). This means that a patient joining the queue in 
week 17 could, on average, expect an access time of 12 
weeks, whereas by the 800th patient (arriving in week 38) 
the expected access time was down to 2 weeks. Compared 
with the representations in figures 1 and 2, this diagram 
has the advantage of being less sensitive to individual 
deviations from the typical access times. It provides a 
global view of how access times develop and how they can 
be related to surges or drops in patient inflow or outflow. 
More specifically, figure 3 shows how the decrease in 
mean access times from week 31 onwards was indeed 
linked to a surge in outflow, rather than a drop in inflow. 
As such, it was clearly the result of the capacity increase.
Along with the sudden decrease in access times due 
to the increase in capacity, the number of new patients 
being referred by their GPs increased significantly. For 
example, figure 4 shows an increase from 10 new referrals 
in weeks 29 to 30 in week 31.
From the interviews, we learnt that referrers (ie, GPs) 
select those hospitals that have the shortest access times. 
An unforeseen consequence of this was that the drastically 
reduced access times in the studied unit had a pulling or 
magnetic effect. Once the extra capacity was added, extra 
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Figure 5 Relative share of NP and RP per week. NP, new patients; RP, returning patients.
slots became available which allowed the hospital to offer 
very short access times. As such, the system responded 
quickly through a market mechanism based on access 
times. Being aware of the dramatically reduced access 
times, GPs directly started to refer a greater proportion of 
their patients to this hospital.
This sudden inflow had consequences for the ratio 
of new to returning patients, which also changed from 
week 31 onwards. In the first 30 weeks of the year, there 
were typically about 13 new patients per week (figure 4) 
representing 15%–20% of the patients seen (figure 5). 
However, in weeks 31–49, the average number of new 
patients increased sharply to an average of 28 per week, 
while the proportion of new patients correspondingly 
increased to 30%–40% as of week 31 (figures 4 and 5).
These additional new patients continued to fill the 
system. However, the increased inflow had a multiplier 
effect as each new patient admitted would typically have 
four follow-up appointments in the year following their 
first visit. In the worst-case scenario, this could result in 
a situation where there would be insufficient capacity for 
returning patients.
When we reflect on our findings, the actions of the 
department seem to have triggered a potential amplifica-
tion of its backlog. First, by adding capacity, and second 
by then accepting more new patients than the depart-
ment would be able to cope with in the longer term. 
While we do not have accurate database information for 
the following year, the interviews provided information 
that new capacity problems did emerge. These capacity 
problems were a consequence of the vicious cycle that was 
started by deliberately expanding capacity and occurred 
despite the best intentions to reduce waiting times and 
increase patient care quality and satisfaction.
DISCuSSIOn
In this case study, we focused on the access times and 
the capacity management of a hospital’s rheumatology 
department. We first revisit the research question before 
considering the general implications of our study.
The main research question focused on how patient 
waiting times vary following an expansion in capacity. 
Our analysis revealed that the local managerial decision 
to temporarily add extra capacity to reduce the backlog 
(ie, shorten access times) had a magnetic effect on GPs 
who then referred many more patients to this hospital 
rather than elsewhere. The increase in new patients and, 
as a consequence, the avalanche of follow-up appoint-
ments were disproportionate to the extra capacity.
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Figure 6 Causal network of the rheumatology situation.
Furthermore, the decision to allow a significant increase 
in the inflow of new patients once this new capacity was 
added resulted, at least in the short term, in a substan-
tial change in the ratio of new to returning patients. With 
a surge in new patients, most of whom would need four 
follow-up appointments; it was inevitable that the depart-
ment would later become overwhelmed with these new 
patients requiring multiple returning appointments.
Reductions of waiting time result in increased inflow. 
However, in this case, the temporary aspect of the waiting 
time reduction affects capacity supply in the short term 
while creating even more demand for the same capacity 
in the longer term. A different approach towards waiting 
time reduction, such as process improvements, would 
arguably have had a smoother and more structural 
impact. Also these process improvements could have been 
expected to lead to increased inflow, but at a level that 
matched the structural capacity, such that a new equilib-
rium could be established based on shorter waiting times.
In hindsight, two local decisions, to increase capacity 
and to use this to accept many more new patients, were 
important sources of artificial variability which triggered 
a self-inflicted multiplier effect. This effect was initially 
considered as a potential example of a service bullwhip 
effect. The service bullwhip effect also relates to a trigger 
event in a supply chain that induces demand distortion.22 
However, we argue for a simpler multiplier effect to have 
taken place. We have constructed a causal network of the 
rheumatology situation, figure 6, to further explore this 
multiplier effect.
The network shows that a sharp decrease in the depart-
ment’s access times (here referred to as hospital A) caused 
GPs to switch their demand by opting to refer patients to 
hospital A rather than elsewhere (hospital B). This was 
possible because GPs were aware of the improved access 
time offered by hospital A, which distinguished it from 
hospital B. This resulted in a sharp increase in the inflow 
of new patients of whom an unlimited number were 
accepted (although one would expect the access times 
to eventually increase as appointments fill up until a new 
equilibrium in reached with hospital B). This boosted 
the ratio of new to returning patients, and resulted in a 
massive increase in demand for follow-up appointments 
due to a multiplier effect with typically four returning visits 
in the year following first visit. The increase in follow-up 
appointments absorbed all the available capacity, which 
had a negative effect on the access times offered to future 
new patients.
It is striking to see that the increase in new patients 
has a self-reinforcing effect on the demand for physi-
cian capacity due to the multiplier effect of follow-up 
appointments. This reinforcing effect reveals itself in the 
next stage of the supply chain and is typical for health-
care environments where follow-ups are common. The 
increase in inflow is the consequence of continuous and 
instantaneous information sharing between the hospital 
(and its rheumatology department) and GPs. Earlier, the 
GPs’ ability to select hospitals based on their access times, 
acted as a variability absorbing or stabilising mechanism 
in case of ‘normal’ variability and gradual changes in 
wait times. For example, as soon as one of the hospitals 
would tend to get to a higher inflow of patients and hence 
increased access times, the GPs responded by selecting 
different hospitals in the system. In turn, this would bring 
the inflow level back to the original level, rebalancing the 
system load. However, in this case, the temporary capacity 
change disturbed this self-stabilising mechanism. The 
case stresses that it is insufficient to rely on a local supply 
chain perspective. Here, system awareness is necessary 
and this requires considering the referral behaviour of 
GPs and the delivery performance of other competing 
hospitals when addressing variability and buffers. The 
market mechanism, based on access times, that this case 
study has highlighted, clearly requires a system view to 
smooth the demand and keep long-term access times at 
an acceptable level.
The theoretical contributions of this study are three-
fold. First, we contribute to the knowledge on flow, and 
consequently the ‘theory of swift and even flow’19 by posi-
tioning artificial variability as a managerial problem that 
negatively affects flow, and we show the possible nega-
tive effect of a common buffering approach. The addi-
tion of capacity would normally be a means to buffer 
against day-to-day variability. However, it now became 
a ‘disturbing’ factor or source of variability itself for 
longer-term variability. Based on this study, and given the 
dynamics of the complex interaction between variability 
and buffers, we stress the need to apply a system view 
when pursuing flow improvements. Introducing poorly 
informed local policies can negatively affect flow.7
Second, we contribute to the knowledge base on the 
role of variability in healthcare environments.13 14 23 The 
hospital’s well-intended actions caused inflow variability; 
here our study provides an example of unexpected 
outcomes related to improvement initiatives. We showed 
a multiplier effect, one that was self-inflicted and caused 
by decision-making being based on a local rather than 
a system perspective. Given the existence of a market 
mechanism based on access times, supply chain partners 
need to make decisions based on an overview of available 
‘market information’, and be sensitive to regional effects. 
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This decision to allow new patients has strong similarities 
with Roemer’s Law,24 25 which underlines that available 
capacity will be utilised.
Third, we contribute to the growing knowledge base 
on process improvement, which includes approaches 
such as Six Sigma and lean thinking.26 27 Earlier research 
identified three paradoxes in healthcare improvement 
initiatives: (1) improvement initiatives target parts of a 
system, but fail to address underlying system constraints, 
(2) local improvements do not account for regional inte-
gration and (3) rules that improve the service organisa-
tion for one department may create obstacles for other 
departments.6 Our results provide illustrations of these 
paradoxes. In addition, by confirming the importance of 
variability and buffer reduction, an area that has recently 
received increasing attention in the literature on lean 
thinking. Lean is generally considered to include the 
concept of mura, which reflects unevenness or variability 
as can be found in the healthcare field.28 Hopp29 (p.89) 
considers the ‘production of goods or services to be 
lean if it is accomplished with minimal buffering costs’. 
After an initial focus on direct waste, more mature lean 
approaches tend to focus on reducing variability and 
buffers.29 This study contributes by providing an example 
of the interaction between variability and capacity buffers 
within a hospital setting.
An obvious limitation of this research is that it is 
based on a single case study, which consequently limits 
the generalisability of the findings. Another limitation 
relates to the fact that the service supply chain in this 
paper is a simple dyadic structure of GPs and a relatively 
small rheumatology department with new and returning 
patients. As such, it is not representative of very complex 
networks with many interdependencies needing to be 
understood. A strength of the study is its combination 
of objective quantitative and subjective qualitative data 
that contributes to the accuracy and reliability of the 
findings.
We would encourage further research aimed at 
increasing the knowledge on multiplier effects and the 
dynamics between variability and buffers. Where this 
study took a system perspective, a patient’s perspective on 
variability and buffers could add an extra dimension to 
this field of research.
COnCluSIOnS
This research has identified the variation in access times 
that follows from adding capacity. We have seen that 
access times are heavily influenced by sources of artifi-
cial variability such as managerial decisions about adding 
capacity and accepting new patients. This can cause 
undesirable dynamics in the variability–buffer interac-
tion. Our findings lead us to agree with earlier research30 
that concluded that synchronising service supply chains is 
‘complex’ and ‘non-intuitive’.
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